We use randomized program offers and multiple follow-up survey waves to examine the effects of entrepreneurship training on a broad set of outcomes. Training increases shortrun business ownership and employment, but there is no evidence of broader or longerrun effects. We also test whether training mitigates market frictions by estimating heterogeneous treatment effects. Training does not have strong effects (in either relative or absolute terms) on those most likely to face credit or human capital constraints, or labor market discrimination. Training does have a relatively strong short-run effect on business ownership for those unemployed at baseline, but not at other horizons or for other outcomes.
Introduction
Governments and donors spend billions of dollars subsidizing entrepreneurship training programs around the world. 1 Arguments for subsidizing training are manifold, and span theories of allocative and/or redistributive frictions in credit, labor, insurance, and human capital markets.
But such arguments have been difficult to evaluate empirically due to classic endogeneity problems from selection into training. 2 We test whether self-employment training mitigates market or redistributive frictions by estimating heterogeneous treatment effects from randomly assigned offers of free entrepreneurship training in the largest and broadest social experiment on entrepreneurship training ever conducted in the United States, and to our knowledge, any other country in the world. 3 The U.S. Department of Labor and the Small Business Administration (SBA) created Project Growing America through Entrepreneurship (GATE) to evaluate the effectiveness of offering free training to any individual interested in starting or improving a business (Benus et al. 2009 ). More than four thousand individuals applied for a limited number of slots for free 1 See http://fieldus.org/Publications/2008/index.html and http://www.sba.gov/content/small-businessdevelopment-centers-sbdcs for directories of entrepreneurship training programs in the United States. For a description of programs in the European Union, see e.g. European Commission (2010) . 2 For example, see Ashenfelter (1978) and LaLonde (1986) for seminal work on identification problems in job training. Card et al's (2010) recent meta-analysis of the job training evaluation literature finds no statistically significant mean differences between experimental and non-experimental impacts. There has been much less work evaluating the effects of entrepreneurship training. 3 Benus et al (1994) evaluates results from a demonstration experiment on self-employment training for U.I recipients in Washington and Massachusetts, and finds some evidence of large positive impacts on self-employment, total earnings, and job creation. A number of recent studies use randomized experiments to evaluate impacts of business training on micro-entrepreneurs in developing countries (Field, Jaychandran, and Pande 2010; Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungooden 2011; Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar 2011; Karlan and Valdivia 2011) . These studies have generally found some positive, but mixed, results. One key external validity issue when comparing across (developing vs. more-developed country) settings is how labor market differences affect sample composition; e.g., in many developing-country settings, access to formal labor markets may be limited in the long-run as well as the short-run. For recent non-randomized approaches to identifying effects of self-employment training programs, see, e.g., Kosanovich and Fleck (2001) , Rodriguez-Planas (2010) , Almeida and Galasso (2010) , and Oosterbeek, van Praag and Ijsselstein (2010). entrepreneurship training services at training providers including SBA-funded Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs) and non-profit community-based organizations (CBOs) located across 7 sites in 3 states. SBDCs and CBOs are the predominant providers of entrepreneurship training services in the U.S. market. 4 Subjects assigned to the treatment group were offered an array of best-practice training services. Subjects assigned to the control group were not offered any free services. The ninepage application form yields a rich set of baseline data, and an examination of these data confirms that assignment to treatment was orthogonal to baseline characteristics. Project followup surveys at 6 and 18, and 60 months after treatment assignment yield a rich set of outcome measures. The 60 month follow-up survey provides rare measures of long-run outcomes.
The GATE assignment to treatment produced a 126 percent short-term increase and a 33 percent long-term increase in the amount of training received. Recipients reported the training as useful in follow-up surveys, and the treatment group was 11-13 percentage points more likely to create a business plan and 2-6 percentage points more likely to start a business. These results offer reassurance that any null effects on more ultimate outcomes are not simply due to a weak treatment (lack of compliance, quality, intensity, etc.).
We examine GATE's impacts on a broad range of more ultimate outcomes. Prior work focuses on the average training impacts on the unemployed and finds some evidence of positive effects on business starts, employment and total earnings in the long run (Michaelides and Benus 2010) . To test hypotheses regarding rationales for training interventions, we examine several additional heterogeneous treatment effects and their implications for whether and why it makes sense to subsidize training. We also examine a broader range of outcomes in our impacts analysis of average as well as heterogeneous treatment effects. In addition, we conduct a new set of robustness checks for the effects of differential attrition (treated subjects were 4-5 percentage points more likely to complete the follow-up surveys), and examine treatment and control group compliance and distributional effects on business sales and employment.
Our results on average treatment effects across the entire sample suggest that GATE significantly increased the likelihood of business ownership at 6-months (5pp on a base of 0.36) but not thereafter. 5 There is a more modest increase in overall employment at 6-months (3pp), suggesting some substitution between self-employment and wage/salary employment. We find no evidence, however, of average treatment effects on other outcomes, including measures of business performance, household income, and work satisfaction at any horizon. We also show that the estimates are not overly sensitive to reasonable assumptions about how attrition affects the composition of the treatment vs. control groups.
We also provide novel results on heterogeneous treatment effects, using these interactions to shed light on the empirical importance of various rationales offered for training subsidies. Credit constraints are one rationale offered for training subsidies: if training is valuable but potential recipients lack the liquidity to pay for it, offering low-cost training may be a cost-effective way (compared to, say, subsidizing lending) to improve access. But we do not find any evidence that training has lasting effects, or relatively strong effects, on those who report having bad credit or no credit. Another rationale for training subsidies is human and managerial capital constraints: if education or managerial labor markets do not function well, then low-cost training may improve efficiency or efficiently redistribute to the most affected parties. But we do not find strong 5 The point estimates fall from 5pp at the 6-month follow-up, to 2pp at the 18-month follow-up, to 0-1pp at the 60-month follow-up.
evidence that training has lasting effects, or relatively strong effects, on those with low education, less family business experience, or less managerial experience.
Labor market discrimination is a third rationale for training subsidies: if minorities face greater discrimination from employers than from customers or lenders, then subsidizing training may be a relatively efficient method for redistributing to groups affected by discrimination in the labor market. But we do not find any evidence that training has lasting effects, or relatively strong effects, for minorities or women. In fact, treatment effects on business ownership are significantly lower for women at both the 6-and 18-month follow-ups.
Unemployment insurance frictions are a fourth rationale for training subsidies: training may be a relatively efficient way to insure against job loss by providing recipients with incentives to work by creating a job for themselves (and perhaps others). We find limited support for this hypothesis: the GATE treatment effect on business ownership at 6-months was significantly greater for those who were initially unemployed compared with those who were employed at baseline. But we do not find any other evidence of relatively strong effects for the unemployed, nor do we find any evidence of lasting effects for the unemployed.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides more details on GATE, including its research design and implementation, the nature of the training services received by subjects, and GATE's average impacts on business planning and starts. Section 3 presents our results on more ultimate outcomes of interest (business ownership, employment, business sales, having employees, household income, and work satisfaction) with a focus on using heterogeneous treatment effects to test hypotheses about the (redistributive) efficiency of selfemployment training. Section 4 concludes.
The Growing America through Entrepreneurship (Project GATE) Experiment

a. Evaluation and Treatment Design
Growing America through Entrepreneurship (Project GATE) was an evaluation designed and implemented by the U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Small Business Association. The GATE experiment is the largest-ever randomized evaluation of entrepreneurship training and assistance involving more than four thousand participants. It differs from earlier large-scale evaluations in the United States because its training was marketed to any individual interested in starting or growing a business, and not limited to individuals receiving unemployment or welfare benefits. Training providers marketed GATE to a broad group of potential entrepreneurs with an extensive campaign that included public service announcements, paid advertisements, and flyers and posters at One-Stop Career Centers. Individuals interested in receiving training had to first attend an orientation meeting at one of the 21 participating One-Stop Career Centers in the seven GATE cities. Anyone attending the orientation meeting was then eligible to apply for GATE by completing a nine-page application form with questions on demographics, work and business 6 Demonstration programs in Washington and Massachusetts starting in 1989, and Self-Employment Assistance programs in several states starting in 1993, targeted unemployment insurance recipients. The Self-Employment Investment Demonstration, implemented from 1988 to 1992 in five states, targeted AFDC recipients. experience, and the individual's current business or new business idea. Applicants were informed that "GATE does not have space for everyone" and that a "lottery or random drawing will decide whether you will be able to enter the program."
Program coordinators reviewed applications for completeness and then randomly assigned all complete applications to the treatment or control group with equal probability. The treatment group was offered an array of free services. Program administrators informed the control group that the GATE program did not have the capacity to offer them services, and administrators offered no referrals to other (free) services either. Individuals in both groups were notified that they would be mailed follow-up surveys in 6, 18, and 60 months.
The array of GATE services offered to the treatment group began with a one-on-one assessment meeting to determine an individual's specific training needs. Then training was provided by experienced business consultants in classroom and/or one-on-one settings.
Classroom offerings targeted a variety of general and specialized topics at different experience levels.
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One-on-one counseling was designed to provide advice that was customized to the individual's experience, capability, circumstances, and opportunities. GATE "training" was always offered as this bundle/menu of services, and hence we cannot disentangle the effects of its different components. Benus et al. (2009) estimate that the total cost of providing training to GATE recipients was between $850 and $1,300 per person.
B. Sample Characteristics and External Validity
For the study, 4,197 individuals completed the application process and were randomly assigned to the treatment (N = 2,094) or control (N=2,103) group. Among participants, 19 percent were self-employed and 39 percent were receiving unemployment insurance (UI) benefits at the time of the application. GATE participants do not differ substantially from the U.S. entrepreneurial population in demographic characteristics such as race, gender, age, marital status and education (Benus et al., 2009) . Given these characteristics and GATE's mass marketing, GATE treatment effects plausibly apply to a broad population of entrepreneurs and potential entrepreneurs who are interested in training. GATE's filters, which included attending the orientation session and completing the application, imply that its external validity is questionable for populations more marginally interested in training; e.g., for those who would only participate if some other benefit was conditioned on participation or if particularly aggressive marketing techniques were employed. Table 1 starts by comparing mean baseline characteristics across the treatment and control groups. Random assignment was not stratified by site, but each site produced roughly 50-50 assignments nevertheless. Among the numerous baseline characteristics measured in the application, only one, age, is statistically different between treatment and control. One would expect to find one or two significant differences by chance, and the magnitude of the age difference is small (< 1 year). In any case, when estimating treatment effects we present results both without covariates as well as with controls for a large set of detailed baseline characteristics. Table 1 also compares treatment and control completion rates and baseline characteristics for each of the three follow-up surveys. Control group members are significantly more likely to attrit: the completion rate differs by 4-5 percentage points on a base of 56-80 percent for each follow-up wave. However, despite differential attrition rates overall, we do not find differences in the observable composition of the treatment versus control groups, based on characteristics observed in the baseline. The number of significant differences is about what one would expect to find by chance, and the magnitude of these differences is small. More formally, in a regression of follow-up survey completion on baseline characteristics, treatment status, and baseline characteristics interacted with treatment status, the F-tests on the interaction variable coefficients have p-values of 0.214 for Wave 1, 0.823 for Wave 2, and 0.091 for Wave 3. Despite this reassurance, we investigate how treatment effects might be biased if there is in fact differential attrition (e.g., on unobservables) in Section 3.E below.
C. Randomization Integrity and Differential Attrition
D. Empirical Strategy
Our main specification for estimating average treatment effects uses simple means comparisons or OLS intent-to-treat estimates, conditional on all of the baseline covariates shown in Table 1 . When estimating heterogeneous treatment effects we add a set of interactions between baseline covariates and treatment assignment to the model.
E. Treatment Effects on Services Received, Business Planning, and Trying Business Ownership
Given that the control group was not restricted from obtaining training elsewhere, it is important to examine whether and how the GATE treatment actually changed the use of training and business planning. Table 2 shows that the treatment group was an estimated 37 percentage points more likely to receive any training in the 6 months following random assignment than the control group. 8 Examining who receives entrepreneurship training, we find only a few characteristics that predict take up of training by each follow-up wave. Focusing on the main effects we find some evidence that African Americans and the more educated are more likely to receive training (see Appendix Table 1 ). Examining
The treatment group also received more than twice the number of hours of training by the first follow-up wave. The difference in training received is 9 hours at Wave 1 and 7 hours summing across waves. Drexler et al. (2011) find substantial effects on business practices and outcomes from only a few hours of extra training among microcredit users in the Dominican
Republic. Additionally, the extra hours of classroom and one-one-one counseling training time may have translated into considerably more hours spent researching, writing business plans, and doing "homework" by the participant for the business idea.
Follow-up survey responses also indicate that GATE participants were satisfied with services (Appendix Table 2 ). 51.7 percent of GATE recipients reported that "the overfull usefulness" of the services received was "very useful", with 33.7 percent responding "somewhat useful". Most recipients of GATE training responded that services helped "a lot" or "somewhat" with at least one specific aspect of the business or business planning (e.g., marketing strategy, accounting, networking, information technology). The treatment group reports greater satisfaction overall, and for each of the training aspects, than control group trainees (who obtained non-GATE training of their own accord). These responses, along with the experience, best-practice approach, and scale of the service providers (e.g. the SBA-funded SBDCs), suggest that any null effects are not due to low-quality training that is particular to GATE. Table 3 shows that GATE affected some business planning and practice outcomes as well. Treated individuals were 13 percentage points more likely to have written a business plan by Wave 1, and this difference persists over time. This translates, to a relatively small degree, into participants trying business ownership: there are significant differences of 4 and 5 percentage points at the 6-and 18-month follow-ups. By 60-months the difference shrinks to 2.5 differential take up between the treatment and control groups, we find only a few significant differences. F-tests for differential take up for all covariates do not reject equality in any of the three follow-up waves.
percentage points, with a p-value of 0.135. We do not find any differences in loan applications, however, on a low base; e.g., only 6 percent of the treatment and control groups applied for a business loan by Wave 1.
Treatment Effects on More Ultimate Outcomes
A. Average Effects on Business Ownership and Performance
We start by examining the average impacts on business ownership at each follow-up wave. Table 4 reports estimates. For the treatment group, 40.1 percent are self-employed business owners at the 6-month follow-up survey. This rate of business ownership is 5.2 percentage points higher (conditional on baseline covariates) than for the control group. At the 18-month followup, the treatment effect point estimate remains positive, but the difference of 2.2 percentage points is smaller (control group mean = 0.41) and no longer statistically significant. Sixty months after random assignment, the treatment and control groups have nearly identical levels of business ownership. The positive effects of entrepreneurship training on business ownership appear to die out over time.
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Before examining additional outcomes, we briefly examine treatment effects on the dynamics of business entry and exit in Appendix Table 3 . Given that the treatment and control groups start with roughly equal ownership rates (Table 1 ), any differences in business ownership rates at each of the follow-up survey waves are due to differences in business creation rates, differences in business exit rates, or both (Fairlie 1999). The second panel of Appendix Table 3 shows that, 9 The results are not due to the influence of side or casual businesses, or disguised unemployment (Carter and Sutch 1994) . Defining business ownership with 30 or more hours worked per week, we find lower rates of business ownership, but similar treatment-control differences: the treatment group has a 4.2 percentage point higher rate of full-time business ownership than the control group at Wave 1, dropping to 1.8 percentage points at Wave 2, and dropping to essentially zero at Wave 3. We also restrict business ownership to only include businesses reporting positive sales at each survey wave to remove non-serious self-employment activities. Again, we find similar results.
conditional on not owning a business at baseline, treatment group members were far more likely to have started a business 6 months later. This effect dissipates over time. The third panel of Appendix Table 3 shows that, conditional on owning a business at baseline, we do not find any significant differences in exit rates. Thus the treatment effect is driven primarily by a difference in business starts, not exits.
Overall, the estimates indicate that entrepreneurship training increased average levels of business ownership in the short-run. Entrepreneurship training appears to have drawn new people into starting businesses but did not increase the survival rates of pre-existing businesses.
The effects of entrepreneurship training disappear in the long run, however. This implies that the marginal businesses produced by entrepreneurship training do not survive in the medium/longrun. 10 Indeed, the estimated average null treatment effects on sales and employees (Table 4) suggest that the marginal businesses had low levels of sales and generally did not hire employees. The positive Wave 1 average treatment effect on business ownership is not accompanied by positive average treatment effects on business sales or the likelihood of having an employee. Nor do we find significant treatment effects on sales or employees at longer horizons. The results for employment do not differ when we change the focus from having an employee to the number of employees (Appendix Table 4 ). Results are similar for other measures of business performance, including profits, alternative measures of business income, and summary indices that standardize and aggregate across outcomes (Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007) . These estimates are also reported in Appendix Table 4. 11 10 Treatment effects do not vary with local economic conditions. We estimate specifications that include the unemployment rate, and treatment interacted with the unemployment rate (with unemployment varying by MSA and year/month), and find no evidence of heterogeneity conditional on underlying unemployment in the local economy. 11 The business outcome summary index actually shows a small negative treatment effect in the long-run.
B. Effects on Firm Size Distribution?
Table 5 explores whether the average treatment effect analysis might obscure important effects on the firm size distribution. We focus here on long-run (Wave 3: 60-month) outcomes, for treatment vs. control, and for both all businesses and business started post-treatment. Both the sales and employee distributions show that our sample has fewer large businesses than the United States as a whole. This is partly due to the five-year study period as the distributions are more similar when we examine all U.S. businesses created in the past 5 years (reported in the final column). Focusing on the treatment vs. control comparisons, we do not find that businesses created by the treatment group are more likely to be very successful than businesses created by the control group. In fact, slightly less than two percent of businesses owned by the treatment group have sales of $500,000 or more, compared with more than four percent of businesses owned by the control group. The difference is statistically significant and remains after controlling for baseline characteristics. The treatment-control difference, however, is less clear when we focus on other sales level cutoffs and when we focus on high levels of employment. We also do not find a significant difference between the full treatment and control distributions reported in Table 5 using a chi-square test. Overall, we do not find evidence that entrepreneurship training increased the likelihood of creating high-revenue or high-employment firms five years post-random assignment.
C. Average Effects on Overall Employment, Household Income, and Work Satisfaction
Returning to Table 4 , we also estimate treatment effects on broader outcomes: the likelihood of being employed (wage/salary work or business ownership), household income, and work satisfaction (which we use as a proxy for potential non-pecuniary benefits of employment or self-employment).
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The positive 6-month effect on employment suggests that the business ownership effect does not fully crowd-out wage/salary work. Because the treatment effect on business ownership was larger at 4.6 percentage points about half of the short-run increase in business ownership resulted in higher overall employment rates for the treatment group. The other half of the increase in business ownership rates was a substitution away from wage/salary work. Similar to the business ownership effect, the effect on overall employment dissipates over time. For income and work satisfaction, we do not find significant effects at any horizon.
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D. Compliance and Local Average Treatment Effects
To gauge how much larger treatment estimates are when we focus on estimating the effects of receiving entrepreneurship training (i.e. "treatment-on-the-treated" or local average treatment effects) instead of estimating the effects of being offered free entrepreneurship training (i.e.
"intent-to-treat" effects), we estimate instrumental variables regressions. As reported in Table 2, 18.8 percent of the treatment group did not receive any entrepreneurship training in the first 6 months after random assignment and 44.0 percent of the control group received at least some entrepreneurship training in the 6 months after random assignment. To account for both types of non-compliance and estimate the effects of receiving entrepreneurship training on business outcomes, we estimate the following two-stage regression. The first-stage regression for the probability of receiving any entrepreneurship training is:
The second-stage regression for the outcome of interest, y, is:
12 See, for example, Hamilton (2000) and Kawaguchi (2004) . 13 We also estimate treatment effects on total earnings by combining separately reported business earnings and wage/salary earnings (as opposed to direct reports of total household income). We do not find any significant treatment effects on this measure either. Nor do we find any significant effects on reliance on public assistance.
where X i includes baseline characteristics, T i is the treatment indicator, E i is the predicted value of entrepreneurship training from (3.2), and u i and ε i are error terms. Δ provides an estimate of the local average treatment effect.
The IV estimates are reported in Appendix Table 5 for the six main outcomes reported in Table 4. 14 As expected given the non-compliance rates, the point estimates are generally scaled up by a factor of 2 to 3 over the "intent-to-treat" estimates reported in Table 4 . None of our statistical inferences change. The LATE estimates indicate that receiving entrepreneurship training increases business ownership by 13.5 percentage points and overall employment by 7 percentage points at Wave 1. There is no strong evidence of effects on long-term business ownership or other outcomes.
E. Exploring the Impact of Differential Attrition on the Estimates
Although we do not find strong evidence of differential attrition based on observables in Section 2.C above, or that treatment effect estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of controls for baseline characteristics (Table 4) , follow-up survey response rates are higher in the treatment group for each of the follow-up waves, raising the concern that attrition may be correlated with unobserved heterogeneity in outcomes as well. To investigate whether differential attrition might have a large effect on the results we follow two different approaches. First, we estimate regressions for our main set of outcomes using the predicted probability of attrition as a sample weight. The full set of baseline controls are used to estimate these predicted probabilities. This 14 Appendix Table 5 also reports estimates of non-experimental correlations between receiving entrepreneurship training and our key outcomes. For these regressions we include only the control group sample and control for all of the baseline characteristics reported in Table 1 . For most of the business outcomes, we find large positive relationships with entrepreneurship training. These estimates, which may be subject to selection bias, are substantially larger than the LATE estimates from the experiment.
technique places more weight on survivors who look like attriters, in an attempt to compensate for the attriters' absence. The estimates are robust to using these weights (Table 6 vs. Table 4 ).
Second, we conduct a bounds analysis using various assumptions about the treatment effects for attriters in the spirit of Horowitz and Manski (2000) and Lee (2009; 2002) . Table 7 's Column 4 reproduces the relevant average treatment effect estimate from Table 4 . Following Kling et al (2007) and Karlan and Valdivia (2011) , we impute to the lower (upper) bound the mean minus (plus) a specified standard deviation multiple of the observed treatment group distribution to the non-responders in the treatment group, and the mean plus (minus) the same standard deviation multiple of the observed control group distribution to non-responders in the control group. In Column 3, for example, we create a conservative treatment effect estimate by assuming that treatment group attriters have the mean value for the dependent variable minus 0.05 standard deviations among non-attriting treatment observations, and that the control group attriters have the mean value for the dependent variable plus 0.05 standard deviations among the non-attriting control observations. Table 7 indicates that the results are not overly sensitive to adding and subtracting 0.05 standard deviations from the means, but are sensitive to moving 0.25 standard deviations from the means (Columns 1 and 7). To put the magnitudes of these changes in perspective, Table 7 also reports the treatment and control standard deviations in Columns 8 and 9, respectively (the treatment and control means are reported in Table 4 ). For business ownership at Wave 1, for example, the -0.05 adjustment reported in Column 4 assumes that the attriting treatment group has a 2.5 percentage point lower business ownership rate than the non-attriting treatment sample and that the attriting control group has a 2.4 percentage point higher business ownership rate than the non-attriting control sample. These are large changes from a base business ownership rate of roughly 35 to 40 percent and yet do not result in major changes in the results. 15 If we focus on the disappearance of the 5 percentage point short-run treatment effect by the 60 month follow-up survey, we find it would take an extreme form of biased attrition to regenerate the treatment effect in the long run. For the treatment effect to be 5 percentage points at the 60-month follow-up it would require that the attritors in the treatment group have more than a 0.10 standard deviation higher business ownership rate than non-attritors and attritors in the control group have more than a 0.10 standard deviation lower business ownership rate than non-attritors.
Columns 5-7 of Table 7 also show the particular and strong form that attrition would need to take to create positive effects on outcomes other than short-run business ownership and employment. It would have to be the case that treatment group attritors have substantially more positive treatment effects, and/or that control group attritors have substantially more negative treatment effects, than non-attritors..Thus, it appears as though attrition would have to be very non-random to lead to substantially different results than what we find.
F. Hypothesis Testing Based on Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
To shed light on the rationale for training subsidies, we next explore heterogeneous treatment effects in the data. We estimate these effects by adding several interactions between key baseline characteristics and treatment status to our model of conditional average treatment effects (i.e., we estimate each heterogeneous effect of interest conditional on the others). As such, each row in Table 8A presents results from a single regression. We also estimate average treatment effects on 15 We also estimate bounds using the trimming procedure suggested in Lee (2002 Lee ( , 2009 ). The estimated range is similar to that reported for 0.10 standard deviations for most outcome measures.
sub-samples of key groups in Table 8B , to address the policy question of whether training benefits targeted groups in levels if not relative terms.
Credit constraints are one important rationale for training subsidies: if training is valuable but potential recipients lack access to financing, subsidizing training may be a way to overcome credit market failures that hinder business starts. If this is the case we might expect training to have relatively strong, positive effects on the credit constrained, conditional on other characteristics. The baseline application asks: "Do you have any problems with your credit history?" We interact this variable with treatment status and do not find any evidence that training has relatively strong or lasting on those with credit problems (Table 8A , Column 4).
When we examine the credit constrained sub-sample alone, we also do not find evidence of positive treatment effects with only the treatment coefficient for Wave 1 business ownership being statistically significant (Table 8B , Column 3). We also estimate whether entrepreneurship training differentially affects the level of invested capital in the business for those with credit problems (results not reported). We do not find any evidence that the treatment affects investment, debt, or loan applications, overall or differentially for the credit constrained.
Labor market discrimination is another potential rationale for training subsidies: if employers discriminate more than customers, then low-cost training may be a relatively efficient method for redistributing to affected groups.
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But we do not find evidence that training has relatively strong or lasting effects for minorities or women (Table 8A , Columns 2 and 3). In fact, treatment effects on business ownership are significantly lower for women at 6-and 18-months, producing main effects on business ownership for the female sub-sample that are not statistically significant (Table 8B , Column 3).
Human and managerial capital constraints are another important rationale for training subsidies: if education or managerial labor markets do not function well, then subsidizing training may improve efficiency or efficiently redistribute to the most-affected parties. But we do not find strong evidence that training has relatively lasting or strong effects on those with less education, less previous managerial experience, or less experience working in a family business.
17
Unemployment insurance frictions are perhaps the most important, or at least most commonly invoked, rationale for training subsidies. Training may be a relatively efficient way to insure against job loss by providing recipients with incentives to work by creating a job for themselves (and perhaps others).
18
We test this by interacting treatment status with a measure of initial unemployment. We find that those who were initially unemployed are more likely to have a business at the 6-month follow-up (Table 8A, Column 5 and Table 8B , Column 4). The effect on business ownership, however, disappears and we find no effect in the long-run. We also do not find any other evidence of strong or lasting effects for the unemployed, in either relative (Table 8A) or absolute (Table 8B) terms.
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The results for the unemployed also do not change if we examine treatment effects relative to only those who are initially wage/salary workers. 17 These are the main human capital factors found to be associated with business success in the literature (Parker 2009 and Fairlie and Robb 2008) . 18 An alternative explanation for why the unemployed may benefit more from job training is that they have more time to devote to it. But we do not find any evidence that the unemployed (at baseline) receive more or different training. 19 As noted above, Michaelides and Benus (2010) find a few significant results on an unemployed subsample (defined by participants reporting "looking for work" at the time of the application). We use a slightly broader definition of unemployment to include anyone who is not working in a wage/salary job or self-employed at the time of application. Participating in the GATE program implies some level of interest in work, and our definition facilitates a straightforward classification of our sample into mutually exclusive categories of unemployment, wage/salary work, and self-employment.
Conclusion
Although a substantial amount of money is spent on subsidizing entrepreneurship training around the world, we know very little about its effectiveness and whether it alleviates market frictions. We provide new estimates on the average and heterogeneous treatment effects of entrepreneurship training from Project GATE, the largest and broadest entrepreneurship training experiment ever conducted. We find evidence that the training increased average business ownership in the short-run, but that the marginal businesses were unsuccessful and failed to produce tangible or subjective benefits at any of the three follow-up horizons (6-, 18-, and 60-months). We also find no evidence that training shifts the distribution of firms in important ways (e.g., disproportionately creating very successful firms) that might be missed by analysis of average treatment effects. Although we find higher attrition among the control group, bounds analyses confirm that only extreme forms of biased attrition would change these results.
Our analysis of treatment heterogeneity produces some novel insights about the theory and design of training interventions. Many of the rationales put forward for subsidizing trainingcountering credit or human capital constraints in enterprise development, or labor market discrimination-are not borne out by the data. We do find evidence that GATE's training had relatively strong positive effects on business ownership for the unemployed in the short run, but these effects disappear by the long run. These findings, and the estimated costs of providing training to GATE recipients of $850 to $1,300, suggest that entrepreneurship training may not be a cost-effective method of addressing credit, human capital, discrimination, or employment constraints.
The results here also speak to the importance of understanding which components of training are more and less helpful, and for which populations. Should subsidies for entrepreneurship 20 training be re-allocated to job training? Should content from entrepreneurship training be grafted onto job training? Understanding more about the effects and mechanisms of entrepreneurship training is particularly important given the continued growth and popularity of these programs around the world. Many financial institutions with a social aim now bundle business training with their loans, the U.S. Department of Labor recently funded a new round of GATE programs in four additoinal states, and President Obama recently signed the Small Business Jobs Act which expands funding to SBDCs throughout the country. Notes: (1) All reported characteristics are measured at time of application, prior to random assignment. (2) The wave 1, wave 2 and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months after time of application. Notes: (1) The wave 1, wave 2 and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months after time of application. (2) Treatment-contol differences with covarariates are estimated from a linear probability model that controls for program sites, female, race, immigrant, age, married, children, education level, household income, self-employed at application, health problems, worked in family business, bad credit history, unemployment compensation, employer provided health insurance, autonomy, and risk tolerance. Log household income at W3 Notes: (1) The wave 1, wave 2 and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months after time of application. (2) Treatment-contol differences with covarariates are estimated from a linear probability model that controls for program sites, female, race, immigrant, age, married, children, education level, household income, self-employed at application, health problems, worked in family business, bad credit history, unemployment compensation, employer provided health insurance, autonomy, and risk tolerance. (3) The Wave 3 sample for work satisfaction is restricted to include only the employed. Notes: (1) The wave 1, wave 2 and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months after time of application. (2) Treatment-contol differences with covarariates are estimated from a linear probability model that controls for program sites, female, race, immigrant, age, married, children, education level, household income, self-employed at application, health problems, worked in family business, bad credit history, unemployment compensation, employer provided health insurance, autonomy, and risk tolerance. (3) Sample weights used to estimate treatment-control differences are predicted probabilities of non-response in specified wave from first-stage regression using all covariates.
Treatment-Control Difference
Log household income at W1
Log household income at W2
Work satisfaction: "very satisfied" at W1
Work satisfaction: "very satisfied" at W2 (1) and (7) impute to the lower (upper) bound the mean minus (plus) 0.25 standard deviations of the observed treatment distribution to the non-responders in the treatment group and the mean plus (minus) 0.25 standard deviations of the observed control distribution to non-responders in the control group. Columns (2, 3, 5, and 6) repeat the exercise subtracting and adding the specified standard deviations. Column 4 (unadjusted) reproduces the estimates reported in Log household income at W2
Log household income at W3
Work satisfaction: "very satisfied" at W1 Work satisfaction: "very satisfied" at W2 Work satisfaction: "very satisfied" at W3
Business owner at W3 survey date Log household income at W2
Work satisfaction: "very satisfied" at W1 Notes: (1) Sample includes treatment and control group participants who received any entrepreneurship training by wave 1 follow-up survey (6 months). (2) Evaluation of services was asked at W1. 
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